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The days of Burma’s border-based insurgency may be drawing to a close. As 
elements of the Karen nationalist community barter for an unofficial ceasefire 
with the junta, armed rebel groups on the border are growing increasingly 
marginalized.
In the early 1990s the Karen National Union and opposition alliance headquarters
at Mannerplaw was an alternative axis of power to Rangoon. Today, the situation 
along the Thailand-Burma border has become marginal to the “big picture” of 
Burmese politics—although the plight of hundreds of thousands of 
conflict-affected civilians remains a grave concern.
This shift in the balance of power is illustrated by recent attempts to mediate 
an unofficial ceasefire between a faction of the Karen National Liberation Army,
the KNU’s military wing, and the Burmese military government. Not so long ago, 
such plotting would have been headline news. However, the decline of the 
border-based insurgencies means that these alarums today constitute little more 
than a footnote to history. 
Since 2005, a small group of Karen leaders from inside Burma have been 
attempting to persuade ex-KNU Chairman and Defense Minister, General Bo Mya. and
his old colleague-in-arms, the KNLA Seventh Brigade Commander, Brig-Gen Htain 
Maung, to resume discussion of a ceasefire with the State Peace and Development 
Council. 
The other driving force behind this scheme is Pastor Timothy Laklem—an old 
friend of the Bo Mya family—assisted by the General’s son, Colonel Ner Dah Mya. 
Both men have seen their influence decline, with the failing health of the 
latter’s father. Having been unable to secure positions on the KNU Central 
Committee at last year’s Thirteenth Congress, they seem to have undertaken this 
gambit in order to secure a power base. 
One of the saddest aspects of this story is the way in which Gen Bo Mya has been
manipulated by some of those closest to him. Whatever one thinks of the old 
warlord’s record, he has surely earned the right to a dignified retirement after
half a century on the front lines of the Karen revolution. Thus far, Bo Mya has
been adamant that he will not return to Rangoon—although an unofficial KNLA 
delegation has recently visited the old capital, for secretive talks with the 
SPDC. 
These intrigues represent a “win-win” situation for the generals at Naypyidaw, 
as the return of a faction of the KNU to “the legal fold” would constitute a 
minor political victory for the SPDC.  With Burma now on the UN Security 
Council agenda, and UN Under Secretary-General Gambari expected to return to the
country in November, the SPDC might find it useful to present the international 
community with a KNU ceasefire, while presenting any remaining KNU rebels on 
the border as illegitimate remnants. 
If such a plan falls through, then the most significant insurgent group in the 
country has been kept busy with internal squabbling, while the generals get on 
with their business—a classic example of “divide-and-rule” strategy.  
Meanwhile, the end-game in the civil war is well underway. The KNU has lost 
control of its once extensive “liberated zones,” and the Burma Army is now 
engaged in a protracted and brutal mopping-up campaign, while Snr-Gen Than Shwe 
and his colleagues pursue their self-serving “roadmap to democracy,” and 
consolidate military control from their new capital. 
During more than fifty years of (mostly) low-intensity armed conflict in Burma, 
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insurgency has become a way if life for long-suffering villagers, for combatants
on all sides and for the networks of traders, loggers, spies and aid workers 
that grew out of the war. Many of these groups have vested interests in 
maintaining conflict along the border. For better or worse, the old insurgent 
paradigm is drawing to an end. 
The refugee situation illustrates the changing times. Since the early 1980s, 
refugee camps in Thailand have provided sanctuary to the victims of civil war 
and associated human rights abuses in Burma, and served as unofficial base areas
for armed opposition groups. Since the mid-1990s, as the number of refugees has 
grown (to 150,000 in 2006), so has the number of international aid agencies 
supplying their needs. 
The existence of the refugees—and of some two million other internally and 
externally displaced Burmese—provides testimony to the abuses of the Burmese 
military regime. At the same time, the KNU’s loose control over this civilian 
population bestows legitimacy on the Karen insurgency. 
However, the humanitarian and human rights industry that has grown up along the 
border may be coming to an end. The next few months will see substantial numbers
of Karen and Karenni refugees achieving the durable solution of resettlement to 
third countries. Many of those registered for resettlement are teachers, medics,
administrators, and others from elite sectors of the refugee community. 
Although probably fewer than 10,000 will depart by the end of next year, Ellen 
Sauerbrey, US Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and 
Migration was quoted at the end of August as saying that "there will be no cap 
(for the resettlement of Karen refugees)". These words should alarm the KNU 
leadership. 
There is a warning here from history. As long as there were Lao Hmong refugee 
camps in Thailand, the Hmong ethnic insurgency in Laos could continue, using the
camps as fall-back bases. However, in the 1990s, with the closure of the last 
Lao-origin refugee camps along the northern border, the Hmong insurgency has 
been reduced to a few rag-tag guerilla bands that pose no threat to the Lao 
government, but perhaps serve as a pretext for the continued militarization of 
remote, ethnic minority-populated areas. Such a dire future is something the KNU
should ponder.
Given the decline of the old insurgent paradigm, the options for the KNU and its
allies remain limited. The purge of former prime minister and intelligence chief
Gen Khin Nyunt in October 2004 effectively put an end to the old-style 
ceasefires. The SPDC of 2006 sees little reason to negotiate with what it 
considers a vanquished enemy. Many Karen politicians today recall with misgiving
the squandered opportunities to negotiate a ceasefire in 1994 (before the fall 
of Mannerplaw) or 1996 (before the 1997 Burma Army offensives). 
Fifteen years ago it was possible to believe that the then State Law and Order 
Restoration Council was on its last legs. one final push and the military 
regime would fall. Today, such assessments may be good for morale, but they 
serve as poor bases for devising strategy. The days of the free-wheeling border 
are all but over. It is time for the revolution to move on, and to re-examine 
basic strategy, while there is still time.
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